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Note

Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction and Aircraft Accident Cases:
Hops, Skips, and Jumps Into Admiralty
Admiralty law, while not as old as the sea, is as old as commerce upon the sea. Maritime law arose from the need to regulate
the peculiar interests of seagoing commerce and the history of its
development can be traced through the history of the great seagoing nations of the world. Following this historical precedent,
the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend to "all cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction."' Congress has vested original jurisdiction of "any civil
case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction" in the federal district
courts,' but there is no attempt by the Constitution or Congress to
define the boundaries of that jurisdiction. Consequently, "the precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious
principle or very accurate history.""
Admiralty jurisdiction, originally restricted to the high seas or to
the waters between the ebb and flow of the tide,' has been expanded
to encompass all navigable waters." Largely as a result of the
historical conflict between the English common law and admiralty
courts," an anomaly developed concerning the jurisdictional basis
for contract and tort actions in admiralty. Admiralty jurisdiction
of contract actions depends on the "maritime nature" of the con'G.GILMORE & C.

BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 1-8 (1957) (hereinafter
& BLACK); 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
.200[1], at
2011-14 (2d ed. 1968) (hereinafter cited as MOORE); G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK
OF ADMIRALTY LAW 2 (1939); Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1950); Ingold, Torts Along the Water's Edge:
Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?, 1968 U. ILL. L. FORUM. 95, 96-97.
U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2.
'62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
4
The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
'The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825); Thomas
v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957 (No. 13,902) (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
653 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). See generally GILMORE & BLACK at 28-30;

cited as

GILMORE

MOORE at 2071-78.

1 GILMORE &

BLACK at

8. See note 1 supra.
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tract, but admiralty jurisdiction over torts depends on the "locality"
of the tort.'

The aviation industry is rapidly replacing the shipping industry
as the principle means of interstate and intercontinental commerce
and the resulting increase in aircraft accidents on the high seas
and navigable waters has called into sharp focus the maritime

status of such accidents and the need for resolution of the confusion
of admiralty tort jurisdiction."
Although the locality test for maritime torts is generally accepted, its simplicity is deceptive. Within those courts adopting the
locality test, there is disagreement whether the locality of the origin
of the tortuous conduct or the locality of the consummation of the
tort is the "locality" which controls." Moreover, the locality test
has been criticized as an historical oddity bearing no relation to the
true function of admiralty, which is the regulation of seagoing
commerce; therefore, some courts require that the tort not only
occur on navigable waters, but also be of a "maritime" nature."
'The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865); The Philadelphia, Wilmington
& Baltimore R.R. Co. v. The Philadelphia & Harve De Grace Steam Towboat
Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209 (1859); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
9 Among the advantages of admiralty jurisdiction is that the plaintiff can bring
suit in the federal courts where there is no diversity of citizenship, Payroux v.
Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833); where there is absence of the jurisdictional
amount, Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4 (1834); where there is no independent jurisdictional basis, The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903); and
is not limited to the venue requirements of ordinary cases, MOORE, 5 66, at 499.
In addition, contributory negligence does not bar recovery, Pope & Talbot, Inc.
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), and comparative negligence is applied, Movible
Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1965). Assumption of the risk
has been held not to prevent recovery, King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335
(E.D. Tenn. 1963). But see Gaderson v. Texas Contracting Co., 3 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1924), where assumption of the risk was applied to deny recovery. For other
advantages of admiralty, see Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Sky's
the Limit, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 3-4 (1967).
"See The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649 (1935); The Minnie v. Port Huron
Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935); Wiper v. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 340 F.2d
727 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 812 (1965); The Strabo, 98 F. 998
(2d Cir. 1900); Thompson v. Chesapeak Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 555
(D. Md. 1965).
" Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967);
Campbell v. H. Hackenfield & Co., 125 Fed. 696 (1903); McGuire v. City of
New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAw OF
AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 127 (6th ed. 1940); Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259, 260 (1950); Ingold, Torts Along
the Water's Edge: Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?, 1968 U. ILL. LAW FORUM 95
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NOTE

The Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on the question of
the applicability of maritime jurisdiction to aircraft accidents on
navigable waters and its decisions involving non-aviation admiralty tort cases conflict. In The Plymouth" a vessel anchored
near a wharf caught fire. The fire spread to the wharf and damaged
several warehouses nearby. The Supreme Court denied admiralty
jurisdiction since the "substance and consummation of the injury"
was on land, although the origin of the injury occurred on the
water."
Smith & Son v. Taylor " involved a worker who, while unloading
a ship, was knocked from the wharf into the harbor. The Supreme
Court held the blow giving rise to the cause of action "was given
and took effect" on land and denied admiralty jurisdiction." The
converse situation was involved in The Admiral Peoples.' A passenger disembarking from a ship fell from the gangplank onto the
dock. The Court found admiralty jurisdiction reasoning "the cause
of action originated and the injury commenced on the ship, the
consummation somewhere being inevitable. It is not of vital importance to the admiralty jurisdiction whether the injury culminated
on the stringpiece of the wharf or in the water."'" Although the
Court cited The Plymouth in both Smith & Son v. Taylor and The
Admiral Peoples, the test used to determine the "locality" in these
more recent cases was the origin and not the consummation of the
tortuous conduct. This conflict in approach creates the initial confusion.
Whether the inception or the consummation of the tort is the
standard used, the locality test has been subject to criticism on the
grounds that admiralty jurisdiction should not rest on the happenstance of a tort occurring on navigable water, but rather like maritime contracts, should bear some relation to navigation, business"'o
commerce of the seas. This additional requirement is termed the
(1968); Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Airplanes and Wrongful Death in
Territorial Waters, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964).
12 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
13id. at 33.
14276 U.S. 179 (1928).
id. at 182.
16295 U.S. 649 (1935).
"7Id. at 652-53 citing The Strabo, 98 F. 998 (2d Cir. 1900).
"8See note 10 supra.
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"locality plus" test. The first judicial expression of this concept is
found in Campbell v. H. Hackenfield & Co.," where the Ninth
Circuit stated:
The fundamental principle underlying all cases of tort, as well as
contract, is that, to bring a case within the jurisdiction of a court
of admiralty, maritime relations of some sort must exist, for the
all-sufficient reason that the admiralty does not concern itself with
non-maritime affairs.2
The Supreme Court, when confronted with the "locality plus"
theory, stated that the theory was "too narrow." The Court avoided
the issue of the validity of the theory by finding that even if more
than locality alone
was required, the facts before it satisfied any
21
additional "plus.

The best illustrations of the use of "locality plus" are McGuire
v. City of New York " and Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe
Farms.' In McGuire the plaintiff was injured while swimming at a
public beach. The district court found no admiralty jurisdiction
stating that the locality test was a rule of exclusion or limitation
and that a tort occurring on navigable water was merely prima
facie within admiralty." The plaintiff in Chapman was injured
diving into shallow water from the side of a pier. The court of
appeals denied admiralty jurisdiction stating that "[s]ome relationship between the alleged wrong and maritime service, navigation
or commerce on navigable waters, is a condition sub silentio to
admiralty jurisdiction."' Limiting McGuire and Chapman to the
particular facts involved, it is undeniable that to allow such actions
would have contravened the traditional function of admiralty."
As the court in McGuire properly noted, the touchstone of ad"9125 Fed. 696 (9th Cir. 1903). The first expression of an additional requirement for admiralty jurisdiction is found in 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY 173 (1850) and has come to be known as Benedict's "famous
doubt."
20 Id. at 697. For a criticism of the district court's decision, see Note, 16 HAR.
L. REV. 210 (1902).
"1Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61 (1914).
2 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

23385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
2McGuire
v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
2"Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
21 Crenshaw, Airplanes in Admiralty, 18 S. CAR. L. REV. 572 (1966).
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miralty is "an intimate relation with navigation and interstate and
foreign commerce.""' Unfortunately, the use of the "locality plus"
test in these cases has created another dichotomy which compounds
the initial confusion of origin-consummation."8
The question of the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction to
aircraft accidents occurring on the high seas or on navigable waters
increases the confusion. Illustrative of this problem is Executive
Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland" which involved a jet aircraft which collided with several hundred sea gulls seconds after
take-off from Burke Lakefront Airport. The aircraft had flushed
the gulls from the runway as it took off. The collision resulted in
an immediate loss of power causing the plane to descend striking
the airport perimeter fence and a pick-up truck before settling into
Lake Erie just off shore. The owners of the plane sued in federal
district court alleging negligence and claiming admiralty jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction in admiralty, holding that the cause of action arose
on land since the negligence "was given and took effect" on land,
although the damage was consummated in the navigable waters of
Lake Erie." The majority reaffirmed the "locality alone" test following The Admiral Peoples approach that the origin of the tort is the
locality which controls. Judge Edwards, however, forcefully dissented urging acknowledgment of federal jurisdiction in admiralty
for aircraft accidents on navigable water. 1
In applying the principles governing admiralty jurisdiction to
such borderline cases the courts have made distinctions so fine as
to be non-existent." Executive Jet illustrates the conflict resulting
when an aviation accident is thrust into the historical concepts of
2

1 McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

28

An example of the problem created is King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335

(E.D. Tenn. 1963), where a water skier was allowed to recover in admiralty
due to the finding of "maritime" connection through the fact that plaintiff was
injured while being pulled by a boat.

29448 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court has granted a writ of
certiorai to review the case, but no opinion has been issued as of this writing.
30 d. at 154.
31 Id. at 155-64.
32 Compare The Brand, 29 F.2d 792 (D. Ore. 1928) and The Aetna, 297 Fed.

673 (W.D. Wash. 1924) in which the direction the passenger was proceeding on
the gangplank in a situation similar to that in The Admiral Peoples determined

whether the case lay in admiralty.
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admiralty tort jurisdiction. The majority decided the case within
the traditional framework of non-aviation maritime tort law, i.e.,
did the cause of action arise on land or on navigable water? 3
Judge Edwards, recognizing the important policy question involved,
would have decided the case within the framework of whether the
federal courts have maritime jurisdiction over aircraft crashes on
navigable waters."
To understand the significance of Executive Jet, it is necessary to
trace the development of admiralty jurisdiction with regard to aircraft accidents within the federal courts. In Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins
Airways, Inc.' an aircraft went down off Cape Cod as a result of
engine failure. A wrongful death action was instituted alleging the
cause of the accident was the failure to inspect the plane before
takeoff. The district court held the locus of the tort was the place
where the injury was inflicted and allowed the action in admiralty."
In addition, the Federal Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
was held to apply to aircraft accidents on the high seas.'
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines" reaffirmed the admiralty jurisdiction of aircraft accidents on the high seas. The district court
stated that "in applying the 'locality' test for admiralty jurisdiction,
the tort is deemed to occur, not where the wrongful act or omission has its inception, but where the impact of the act or omission
produces such injury as to give rise to a cause of action.""' In
D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways' a similar conclusion
was reached. A passenger on a flight from Puerto Rico to New
York became terrified when the plane developed engine trouble and
was forced to feather one engine. The passenger went into a state
of shock which resulted in his death several days later. In upholding
admiralty jurisdiction under the DOHSA, the court of appeals
concluded the words "on the high seas" should be capable of exten"Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 152 (6th
Cir. 1971).
Id.at 155.
F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951).
"Id. at 918.
3595

371d.

121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
"Id. at 92.
40259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
"
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sion to include "under" and "over" the high seas. The court noted
this construction prevents the anomaly that a person on a ship
would be protected, but that person several thousand feet above it
would not be afforded similar protection."
Until Executive Jet the law on admiralty jurisdiction for aviation
torts was considered settled by Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc."'
As in Executive Jet, an aircraft crashed into navigable water shortly
after takeoff. ' The court of appeals reasoned that if a tort claim
arising out of an aircraft accident beyond one league from shore is
within admiralty, citing the prior DOHSA aviation cases, then a
fortiori a crash within that limit must also be within maritime
jurisdiction." "To hold otherwise would be to impose an illogical
and irrational distinction on the operation of the broad grant of
admiralty jurisdiction extended by the Constitution and implemented by 28 U.S.C.A. 1333.""'
The court in Weinstein also concluded that the Supreme Court
had rejected the "locality plus" test in Atlantic Transport Co. v.
Imbrovek," but continued, assuming arguendo a maritime nexus
was required, that an aircraft crash on navigable water satisfied
the standard." By way of justification, the court noted:
At the time the Constitution was framed and for a century and a
half thereafter, ships of various kinds were the only means of
transportation and commerce on or across navigable waters. Today, aircraft have become a major instrument of travel and commerce over and across these same waters. When an aircraft
crashes into navigable waters, the dangers to persons and property
are much the same as those arising out of the sinking of a ship or
a collision between two vessels. '
Recognizing the need for revision of the concepts of admiralty
jurisdiction, the court adopted the rule that an aircraft on navigable
11Id. at 495.

-316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
The action was based on the state wrongful death statute since the DOHSA
specifically states that its provisions apply only to acts occurring "beyond one
marine league from the shore." 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
"Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
43

45

Id.

4G234 U.S. 52 (1914). See note 21 supra.
47
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 1963).
48Id.
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waters is recognizable in admiralty. 9
The Weinstein approach has been followed by a number of courts
as much from policy considerations as from the application of the

locality consummation test.9 In addition, the practical problems of
proving the cause, let alone the origin, of aircraft accidents on the
high seas and the consequential reliance on res ipsa loquitur

theories reinforce the rejection of the inception approach to admiralty tort jurisdiction. Despite these considerations, the Sixth
Circuit in Executive Jet found that such a crash was not within
maritime jurisdiction. This holding appears to be contrary to the

great weight of authority for aviation cases as typified by Weinstein.
In view of the considerable confusion in the general area of admiralty tort jurisdiction, such a result is not surprising. Moreover

the solution of this problem is far from simple.
In resolving the policy question whether admiralty jurisdiction
should be extended to aircraft accidents on navigable waters, air-

craft have generally not been considered "vessels" in maritime
law. 1 Airplanes are not subject to the maritime rules regarding
burden of proof;" aircraft crew members are not considered "seamen" within the Jones Act; " aircraft owners cannot limit liability
49

Id. at 766.
9 See Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968); Hornsby v. Fishmeal Co., 285 F. Supp. 990, 993 (W.D.
La. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970); Rapp v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afI'd, Scott v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968); Harris v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F. Supp.
431 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Horton v. J & J Aircraft, 257 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla.
1966); Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla., 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965); Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa.
1965); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). See also Hughes, Recent Changes in Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction, 30 ALA.
LAWYER 328, 332 (1968). Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Sky's the
Limit, 33 J. Am L. & COM. 3, 33-38 (1967).
St "[T]he navigation and shipping laws of the United States, including any
definition of 'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and including the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be construed to apply to seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation of vessels in relation to seaplanes or other aircraft."
75 Stat. 527 (1964), 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1970). See Knauth, Aviation and
Admiralty, An Investigation of Some Admiralty and Maritime Doctrines Useful
to Aviation, 6 AIR L. REV. 226 (1935); Veeder, The Legal Relations Between
Aviation and Admiralty, 2 AIR L. REv. 29 (1931).
52Geoger v. United States, 1949 U.S. Av. Rep. 113 (E.D. Va. 1949).
"'Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Stickrod v. Pan
American Airways Co., 1941 U.S. Av. Rep. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).

1972]

NOTE

in fatal crashes at sea;"4 creditors cannot assert maritime liens
against aircraft; 5 and aircraft do not comply with maritime rules
of the road. On the other hand, in addition to the application of
DOHSA to aviation accidents,57 the admiralty jurisdiction has been
modified to include crimes committed on aircraft. 8 While airplanes
have many features in common with seagoing vessels, there are
great differences. An airplane may have a "maritime" connection
while over the high seas, but this connection does not exist inherently in aviation making all flights, including those over land,
maritime in nature.
Logic offers no ready answer to the problem due to the hybrid
nature of aircraft. What logic exists for granting an aircraft passenger admiralty jurisdiction when the plane crashes on water, yet
denying the same passenger such jurisdiction if the plane descends
to land either before crossing navigable water or after crossing
over it? Likewise as noted in Weinstein, why should a passenger
on a ship be allowed to sue in admiralty for a tort originating on
land and consummated on the high seas, while a passenger of a
plane is denied jurisdiction for a tort having its inception on land,
but culminating on water?
The courts confronted with this dilemma have sought refuge in
54
Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Dollins v. Pan American Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
" United States v. Northwest Air Serv., 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935); United
States v. One Waco Bi-Plane, 1933 U.S. Av. Rep. 159 (D. Ariz. 1932); Foss v.
Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (D. Wash. 1914).
5672 Stat. 799 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (1970).
5

See D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.
1958); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Lavello v. Danko, 175 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Noel v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 94 (D.N.J. 1958); Fernandez v.
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 124 F. Supp. 13 (D. Hawaii 1954), afl'd, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121
F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Atchenson v. United States, 1949 U.S. Av. Rep.
72 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Choy v. Pan American Airways Co., 19 Am. Mar. Cas.
483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963,
43 N.Y.S. 2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aft'd mem., 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S. 2d
459, a/f'd mem., 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944); see generally Comment,
Admiralty Jurisdiction: Airplanes and Wrongful Death in Territorial Waters, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964); Comment, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 907 (1955);
Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1002 (1959).
1866 Stat. 589, 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (1970); 58 Stat. 111 (1944), 18 U.S.C.
2199 (1970).
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the mechanical application of the locality test attaching admiralty
jurisdiction to an aircraft only when the aircraft is above navigable
waters, or, as the court in Executive Jet, effectively denying admiralty jurisdiction by looking to the origin of the tort which will
virtually always be land-based.
Several commentators have argued for federal legislation to resolve the problem." The rationale supporting this conclusion is that
air commerce is too vital to be left to the fortuity of the geography
of occurrence or to be governed by a curious and haphazard combination of maritime and non-maritime law. Therefore, air commerce should be subject to special principles particularly suited to
the peculiar needs of the aviation industry."
There have been attempts in Congress to establish a uniform
body of federal law designed to resolve the conflict of laws and
multiple trial problems of aviation accidents. In 1968 the "Holtzoff
Bill" was introduced which would have created exclusive federal
jurisdiction over any action arising out of accidents involving interstate or foreign aircraft operations."' The bill was criticized because
of the inclusion of private aircraft and the exclusion of intrastate
air carriers and the proposal died in committee." The following
year Senator Joseph Tydings introduced a revised bill which would
have limited the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction to aviation
accidents involving aircraft operated as common carriers, defined
by the bill as aircraft having a seating capacity of ten or more persons, and accidents resulting in the death or personal injury of
five or more persons. 3 Opposition to the proposal centered on the
59Ingold, Torts Along the Water's Edge: Admiralty or Land Jurisdiction?,
1968 U. ILL. LAW FORUM 95 (1968); Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction:
The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1967); Stewart, Aviation Challenges
Admiralty Jurisdiction: Sink or Swim in the Sea of Uncertainty, 35 J. Am L. &
COM. 616 (1969); Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential?,
19 J. AIR L. & COM. 166 (1952); Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Airplanes
and Wrongful Death in Territorial Waters, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084 (1964);
Comment, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 907 (1955).
60Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AIR
L. & COM. 3, 37 (1967).
61
S. REP. No. 3305, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The proposal was authored
by the late Judge Alexander Holtzoff of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia.
62 Hearings on S. 3305 & S. 3306 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
28 6(1968).
3
S. REP. No. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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creation of a federal body of tort law which would "flood the Federal courts with litigation which presently is processed in the state
courts."" The Tydings bill was never reported from committee
and since the defeat of Senator Tydings, the strongest and often
the sole proponent of unification, in 1970, there have been no attempts to create a uniform body of substantive law for aviation
accidents.
This legislation for commercial aviation would have paralleled
the creation of admiralty jurisdiction for the special needs of seagoing commerce. It would have ended the confusion which currently plagues the industry. This legislation would have eliminated
the application of the varied procedures and remedies of each state
or port where the accident occurs and would have provided a uniform standard for the national aviation industry."
However advantageous such a solution would be, based on the
failure of past attempts, it does not appear that Congress will provide the needed legislation in the near future, and until such legislation can be provided, the courts must resolve the dilemma." It
has been suggested that the courts should develop a federal common law of aviation to fill the void left by the legislature." The
federal courts have not been adverse to the development of "federal
common law" in areas where federal rights are involved." The
potential for the development of a body of federal common law for
aviation is best illustrated by the fashioning of the federal law in
the field of labor relations based on the Supreme Court's decision
"Hearings on S. 3305 & S. 3306 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
69 (1969). (Statement of Walter H. Bechman, Jr.). See generally Sanders, The
Tydings Bill, Symposium on Air Accident Investigation and Litigation, 36 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 550 (1970); Comment, Federal Courts-Proposed Aircraft Crash
Litigation Legislation, 35 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1970); Note, Aircraft Crash Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1052 (1970); Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A
Judicial Problem and a Congressional Solution, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 299 (1969).
" Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction: The Last Barrier, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV.
1, 42 (1968).
"6It has been suggested that the courts should refrain from extending admiralty to aircraft accident cases to prevent unwarranted analogy and inappropriate conclusions. Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Sky's the Limit,
33 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 38 (1967).
" Craig & Alexander, Wrongful Death in Aviation and the Admiralty: Problems of Federalism, Tempests and Teapots, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 15-17, 47-48
(1971).
6 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills."9 The Supreme Court held that
since section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947" allows a labor union to sue or be sued in a federal court,
the federal courts are authorized to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. However,
Congress has not provided an aviation counterpart to the Labor
Management Relations Act upon which Lincoln Mills is based.
Moreover, the reluctance of the federal courts to formulate such
rules of decision in aviation litigation is understandable, if not
wholly justified, when one considers the traditional opposition to
the judiciary assuming the function of the legislative branch of the
government.
In view of the failure to adopt either the common law or legislative alternatives, the courts would do well to follow the Weinstein
approach and ignore Executive Jet as precedent. As Judge Edwards
properly noted in his dissent, the issue is whether the federal courts
have jurisdiction over aviation accidents on the high seas. Several
commentators have suggested, in regard to admiralty torts in general, the adoption of the contract concept of maritime jurisdiction
by following a modification of the "locality plus" test as the first
step in ending the confusion surrounding the present status of
admiralty tort jurisdiction. "
The coalescence of contract and tort principles in admiralty
would be particularly suited to the problem of aviation admiralty
torts. As the court in Weinstein concluded in view of the technology of the modern day interstate and foreign commerce, concepts of admiralty cannot remain static. Although aviation may not
be inherently maritime in nature, when an aircraft is over navigable
waters and accomplishing the traditional ends of seagoing commerce, sufficient maritime character attaches to justify inclusion
in admiralty. The wholesale adoption of the Weinstein rule, a process considered complete until Executive Jet, would settle finally
the issue and end the confusion which the Sixth Circuit has increased. The courts in admiralty, like the vessels, men and tech69353 U.S. 448 (1957).
7029 U.S.C. 5 185 (1970).
"' See note 59 supra.
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nology to which it applies, must be propelled into the Twentieth
Century."
R. Alan Haywood

"' Pelaez, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction:The Last Barrier, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV.
1, 43 (1968).

